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I. INTRODUCTION 
Trust is one of the cornerstone elements in successful mediation of complex dis-
putes. This is particularly true in the resolution of the Snake River Basin Adjudication 
controversies. The concept of trust, however, is in itself complex and difficult to unpack-
age. In the context of relations between tribes and the U.S. government, for example, the 
“trust” obligations do not have the happiest of histories. The role of trust in the SRBA 
was both personal and institutional, adding to the multi-layered nature of the negotiations. 
For a mediator, engendering trust in a negotiation is equally complicated, but an appreci-
ation of its importance and how it can be achieved among and between the various par-
ticipants to a negotiation is critical in circumstances like the SRBA. On the other hand, 
trust in a mediator can be both simple—a binary reaction of yes or no—and graduated 
during an extended mediation process. Likewise, trust among and between all the partic-
ipants in a mediation can be equally simple or complicated. 
II. THE THEORY OF TRUST IN NEGOTIATIONS 
Defining trust has become its own enterprise. Most analysts focus on the context 
where the word is used. From a functional perspective, trust has been defined as “social 
integration . . . cooperation . . . and complexity reduction.”1 Other authors define trust by 
what it is not: faith and confidence.2 For purposes of negotiation theory, trust goes from 
shared cultural norms that reduce the noise that inhibits cooperation and leads to the pos-
sibility of mutual gain.3 
According to Francis Fukuyama in Trust, the phenomenon of trust is cultural, based 
upon societal “norms, rules, moral obligations, and other habits.”4 
“Law, contract, and economic rationality provide a necessary but not sufficient ba-
sis for both the stability and prosperity of post industrial societies; they must as well be 
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leavened with reciprocity, moral obligation, duty toward community, and trust, which are 
based in habit rather than rational calculation.”5 In essence, trust leads to the “ability of 
people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations”: social capi-
tal.6 Conversely, distrust that exists in many cultures that have primarily kin relationships 
inhibits the ability to create cooperative economic enterprises.7 
Other authors proposed that trust is, at its base, rational: “trust is, in some sense, in 
our interests . . . we did it because, however hard headed we are, we feel that in some 
sense we will be better off. It’s a foundation for the new capitalist society, where social 
stability can exist despite the mutual antagonism of competition and free markets . . . .”8 
In his Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Robert Putnam 
explores democratic institutions—social, economic, and cultural—that lead to “the char-
acter of civic life, into the austere logic of collective action . . . .”9 In comparing the north 
and south of Italy, he explores the “failure to cooperate for mutual benefit . . . .”10 and the 
“dilemmas of collective action . . . .”11 Although he focuses on the “forms of social capi-
tal, such as trust”12 that engender the “moral resources” necessary for cooperation, he also 
envisions a rational basis for trust. “Virtually every commercial transaction has within 
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can 
be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be ex-
plained by the lack of mutual confidence.”13 
Pushing farther into the rational basis theory of trust, game theorists have studied 
the lack of cooperation in the tragedy of the commons, public good, the logic of collective 
action and the prisoner’s dilemma. By using sophisticated mathematical and computer 
modeling, Martin Nowak in Super Cooperators has analyzed “altruism, evolution, and 
why we need each other to succeed.”14 Starting with the premise that Darwin’s theory of 
evolution dictates that “cooperation is irrational” and contrary to the self interest inherent 
in “survival of the fittest,”15 he explains the logic of why “would-be competitors decide 
to aid each other.”16 In his effort to understand cooperation, Nowak explicates five mech-
anisms that lead to cooperation,17 all based on reciprocity.18 He models multiple strategies 
for individual betterment and concludes that “clusters of cooperators can prevail, even if 
besieged by defectors.”19 Going full circle from a soft to a hard perspective toward trust, 
Nowak concludes that “groups with meaningful social norms outcompete other groups.”20 
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Translating these analyses into the world of negotiations leads to the conclusion 
that parties can achieve mutual benefit through cooperation, and the foundation of coop-
eration is the establishment of trust between them. From an economic perspective, the 
goal of negotiation is to push into the northwest quadrant of a graph of benefits, maxim-
izing the benefits in integrative bargaining rather than viewing the negotiation as a zero 
sum game.21 At the same time, this approach to negotiation attempts to reduce the costs 
to each side so that the outcome can be easier to achieve. The concept is based on joint 
gains, not individual gains. Both sides can be better off by cooperating. 
The process of achieving that outcome in a world where hard bargaining techniques 
and defection are always present called for an incremental approach of testing levels of 
reciprocity and creating trust. The preferred negotiating posture is to move by “baby 
steps” to insure that the cooperative approach to negotiation is reciprocated by the other 
side before preceding further.22 Once that mutual reciprocity is sufficiently established, 
the parties can begin to trust each other and engage in cooperative bargaining. 
At the end of the day, there is inevitably some level of excess benefit to one side or 
another; at least a marginal zero sum game. A high level of cooperation allows the parties 
to “satisfice,” accept the good rather than the perfect, because it is superior to any non-
negotiated outcome. 
III. TRIBAL TRUST 
We should place our trust intelligently, with an eye to moral rectitude. There 
are many examples where excessive trusting has led to downfall. As a peculiarly 
egregious example, consider the unfortunate Native Americans. Faced with an 
unstoppable flood of European settlers, their representatives negotiated with the 
U.S. government about the ownership of land and compensation; their repre-
sentatives were actually well briefed and not under any illusions about govern-
ment settler policy. But each time, they trusted the government to keep agree-
ments; the government never did, the settlers pushed their way through the Pa-
cific . . .23 
Needless to emphasize, tribal trust in state and federal governments should be sus-
pect. That is not to say that an enforceable agreement cannot be superior to its alternative 
of a litigated outcome. Trust can be established both in the negotiation process with or 
without a mediator and in the mechanism of enforcement. Although a cultural basis for 
trust may not exist, trust in a mediation and the negotiation process can be an adequate 
surrogate to lead to an outcome with superior benefits and lower costs than a judicially 
imposed solution. This is particularly true in a natural resource dispute where the judicial 
tools are limited and the problem may demand a far more sophisticated solution. 
At the same time, internal tribal trust is a critical variable both for the tribe and for 
all the other parties. Popular support for the negotiators is essential to achieve a consen-
sual outcome at the end of the day. That internal consensus is also essential to lead the 
other parties to a negotiation to act reciprocally without fear that their ultimate approval 
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of a negotiated outcome will not have sufficient support by the tribe to achieve a sufficient 
level of finality. 
IV. STATE AND FEDERAL TRUST 
Inherent in government is leadership change and turf battles, both of which can 
inhibit cooperation internally and externally. Most of these problems can be surmounted 
by communication, internal negotiation, and inertia and legal constraints for reopening 
solid resolutions. In any negotiation, however, the parties in general and a mediator in 
particular must be assured that a negotiated outcome is binding. Parties will resist situa-
tions when there is a risk of being second-guessed or put into a position where they are 
bargaining against themselves. 
As with tribal governments, trust in a mediator can be a surrogate for trust among 
the parties. A more difficult task for a mediator is to mediate both the issues among the 
parties and issues within a given party. Sometimes it is necessary to even add another 
mediator rather than having a single mediator wear multiple hats. More often, however, 
there will be governmental officials who are sufficiently experienced in cooperative ne-
gotiation and who can serve a mediation role to insure an internal consensus. 
V. NON-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES AND TRUST 
Probably the most challenging arena for trust is in the context of non-governmental 
entities who are not necessarily a party but who have enough leverage to be necessary 
participants in a negotiation. Some of these entities can have no desire to cooperate—
regardless of levels of trust—because of their internal business models or even behavioral 
models. If their sources of funding are dependent on intransigence, there is little motiva-
tion to do anything other than oppose a negotiated outcome. Their task then becomes 
whether or not they have veto power over any given party. 
Generally there are non-governmental entities that are more interested in furthering 
interests other than partisan fund raising or behavioral gratification. They can become 
helpful resources for establishing a consensus if they feel comfortable with a process that 
allows them to reciprocate and be cooperative. Here trust in the mediator can be a useful 
surrogate as well. Again, the mediator needs to be careful about wearing too many hats; 
but there are usually individuals in the private sector or in government who have the 
necessary experience and perception to assist in achieving internal agreements. 
VI. ENGENDERING MEDIATOR TRUST 
In the context of the SRBA, there were three levels of engendering trust in the me-
diation and in the mediator: understanding, optimism, and leadership. In many media-
tions, the first two elements are ubiquitous, but the role of mediator in pursuing an active 
strategy to achieve resolution is controversial. An active strategy, however, can manifest 
itself in various forms, both obvious and less than obvious. Remaining deferential to a 
party or parties can, for example, be an integral part of an active leadership strategy. 
Understanding: Parties expect and appreciate a mediator’s understanding of their 
stated positions. An appreciation of their unstated position or interests is a more delicate 
proposition. Regurgitating stated positions with sufficient nuance to exhibit an under-
standing is a fairly straightforward proposition. Doing so with sufficient emotion to show 
a more basic and complete appreciation is more difficult. Generally there is a need for 
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both more repetition and time to allow the party or parties to have a full and complete 
opportunity to express their positions and to allow the mediators to establish a sense of 
sincere appreciation of their positions. The behavioral needs of the parties to express their 
positions, and, ultimately, their interests should not be understated. One of the great ben-
efits of the informality of mediation is to allow the parties to participate in an ultimate 
resolution at their own pace and in their own manner. 
Interests are another matter altogether. Sometimes the revelation on the part of the 
mediator of actual interests is better shared and sometimes better kept within the media-
tor’s own calculus of a potential resolution. There is usually a boundary between what a 
party feels is proprietary or even doesn’t even fully comprehend and what the mediator 
is at liberty to explicate. Understanding in silence may be a superior tactic in circum-
stances involving delicate issues rather than exhibiting understanding. Regardless of the 
context of revealing an understanding, there must be sufficient empathy and “heart” in 
the communication so that there is both an intellectual and emotional connection that 
promoted “faith” in the mediator. That faith should transcend the literal words expressed 
to a more visceral level of confidence that enables a party to make a calculated leap to 
the next level of negotiation. 
Optimism: If a mediator is not realistically optimistic about the mediation process, 
it is difficult to convince the parties to make the necessary steps to achieve consensual 
resolution. Sometimes that realistic optimism may focus not on the level of water in a 
glass, but the size of the glass ab initio. Other times that realistic optimism may just be a 
high level of enthusiasm for the process of negotiation. 
Another aspect of being positive about resolving a conflict is the ability to show 
creativity in possible solutions. If the parties are unable to see a pathway to a successful 
negotiated outcome, the ability of the mediator to suggest alternative pathways, even if 
there is no immediate acceptance of those suggestions, can create an aura of confidence 
that the mediator can devise a pathway that might ultimately be successful. At the same 
time, that creativity can assist the mediator in defining the actual benefits and costs of 
each potential solution to educate the parties in their decision-making processes. 
Leadership: A mediator who is solely a “cheerleader” in a negotiation generally is 
not as effective as a mediator who has a strategy for reaching consensus, even if that 
strategy renders the mediator’s role to more “cheerleader” than negotiation leader. In a 
dispute like the SRBA, where the parties will have a continuing relationship in an evolv-
ing natural resource, it can be critical to have them believe that “they,” not the mediator, 
devised the resolution. Closure of the immediate dispute is the prelude to subsequent 
conflicts and the parties need to be sufficiently invested in the outcome to surmount future 
challenges that will inevitably arise. The mediator should be able to subordinate any 
credit for an outcome to the needs of the parties. The mediator’s strategy, therefore, 
should be subtly aggressive in leading the parties, not from behind, but by not appearing 
to be in front. 
This more subtle form of leadership can manifest itself in an indefatigability that 
assures the parties that the mediator will not give up on the process. Even when there are 
substantial alterations in the negotiation terrain—the leadership of the parties change; the 
financial climate deteriorates; the natural resources become altered—the mediators abil-
ity to keep the negotiation process moving is even more essential. Natural resource cases 
are not for the timid; oftentimes there is no obvious “end of the day” to preempt a settle-
ment. Perseverance and longevity can assist the parties in finding a “court house steps” 
end game or a mutually recognized superior outcome. 
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VII. TRUST IN AN AGREEMENT 
Many an agreement has fallen apart between term sheet and signed document. In 
the SRBA, the signed document was the agreement; it contained a detailed enumeration 
of the understanding among parties leaving open only those issues that could not, because 
of the nature of a changing resource, be defined. The agreement itself embodied the res-
olution with sufficient specificity that the parties could trust the outcome met their ex-
pectation. 
One of the benefits of negotiating in the world of natural resources is the need for 
future cooperation as an agreement is implemented and as the natural resources change. 
This necessary cooperation can engender future cooperation if the parties decide to do so. 
Often the foundation for that future cooperation is confidence in an enforcement mecha-
nism that either is the agreement itself or externally. Punishment for defectors is often an 
essential element of cooperation. We often cooperate better under duress, punishment, or 
the prospect for punishment, can be necessary to enhance trust in an agreement. 
It is not uncommon to find a dispute resolution mechanism, or at least a process for 
resolving emerging new disputes, included in the terms of the agreement. Essential, how-
ever, is a belief that some external authority—be it societal pressure, inertia, legal decree, 
or other—will enforce the agreement. This enforcement mechanism can actually 
strengthen a negotiated agreement by insuring that defectors will not be allowed to prevail 
over cooperators. 
There are usually contingencies that arise, either anticipated or unanticipated, that 
can challenge the stability of an agreement. This is when the trust nurtured during the 
mediation process becomes critical. That trust can be reinforced by resolution that truly 
has joint gains and benefits for each party that exceed the cost of achieving those benefits 
and are superior to any alternative. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Negotiation theory teaches us that trust creates a negotiation environment condu-
cive to cooperation and that cooperation is critical to achieving mutual gains in a negoti-
ated outcome. In a mediation, the parties can often use trust in a mediator as a surrogate 
vehicle to achieve these mutual gains. Mediators can create a requisite level of trust 
through understanding and optimism. That trust, albeit a necessary element of any suc-
cessful mediation, is not sufficient without a level of leadership that is appropriate for 
any given case. In the SRBA the mediator’s leadership was subordinate to the parties’ 
appreciation that they owned the outcome. That ownership translated into the ability to 
confront and surmount future challenges that are inherent in any natural resource agree-
ment. The trust the mediator had in the parties has been vindicated. The parties have now 
exhibited their mutual interest in maintaining a positive relationship for mutual gains. 
